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How	mortgage	market	credit	conditions	affect	US
presidential	election	results
Aggressive	government	policies	to	prevent	a	collapse	of	credit	may	be	more	important
for	the	election	than	the	rate	of	unemployment,	write	Alexis	Antoniades	and	Charles
Calomiris.
America	is	in	the	middle	of	an	election	year.	Analysts	regularly	speculate	on	how	the
state	of	the	economy	will	affect	voters.	When	they	do	so,	they	usually	refer	to
unemployment	or	changes	in	income	(see	Fair	1978,	1996,	1998,	2002;	Lewis-Beck
and	Stegmaier	2000).	But	there	is	evidence	that,	under	some	circumstances,	changes	in	the	supply	of	credit	can
matter	even	more	in	determining	electoral	outcomes.	Indeed,	our	research	suggests	that	the	aggressive
government	policies	that	have	been	implemented	to	prevent	a	collapse	of	credit	may	be	more	important	for	the
election	than	the	rate	of	unemployment.
There	are	good	reasons	to	suspect	voting	and	credit	subsidies	are	related:	government	policies	subsidising
homeownership	have	been	a	hallmark	of	American	politics	for	nearly	a	century	and	have	also	figured	prominently	in
various	electoral	campaigns	across	the	world.	For	example,	presidents	George	H.W.	Bush,	Bill	Clinton,	and	George
W.	Bush	all	were	vocal	and	active	supporters	of	expanding	mortgage	credit	subsidies.	George	H.W.	Bush	signed
the	GSE	Act	of	1992	establishing	mortgage	purchase	mandates	for	low-income	and	urban	housing	for	Fannie	Mae
and	Freddie	Mac.	President	Clinton	substantially	expanded	those	mandates	and	weakened	FHA	lending	standards.
President	George	W.	Bush	further	expanded	the	GSE	mandates	as	part	of	his	“blueprint	for	the	American	dream.”	
Barack	Obama	has	also	supported	expanded	mortgage	credit.	He	not	only	enacted	a	mortgage	relief	program,	but
also	appointed	former	congressman	Mel	Watt	in	2014	to	oversee	the	renewed	expansion	of	GSE	credit	(see
Calomiris	and	Haber	2014).
The	United	States	is	not	the	only	country	in	which	housing	subsidisation	through	cheap	mortgages	has	figured
prominently	in	electoral	politics.	Margaret	Thatcher’s	popularity	owed	in	no	small	part	to	her	championing	of	the
privatisation	of	council	flats.	In	the	U.K.	today,	the	credit	risk	subsidies	from	the	“help-to-buy”	program	were	the
major	exception	from	the	government’s	austerity	policies,	and	prime	minister	Cameron	has	made	increased	housing
opportunities	a	hallmark	of	his	current	electoral	campaign.	In	Brazil’s	2014	election,	President	Dilma	Roussef
squeaked	to	a	narrow	electoral	victory,	which	some	observers	attributed	to	her	“Minha	Casa	Minha	Vida”	home-
buying	program.
Despite	this	suggestive	evidence	of	a	relation	between	electoral	campaigns	and	credit	subsidies,	and	despite	the
proven	relation	between	the	state	of	the	macro-economy	and	election	outcomes,	prior	to	our	study	of	recent
presidential	elections,	there	was	virtually	no	microeconomic	evidence	of	the	relation	between	changes	in	credit
supply	and	voting	behaviour.
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In	our	research,	we	find	that	voters	do,	in	fact,	punish	incumbent	presidential	candidates	for	contractions	in	the
supply	of	mortgage	credit.	We	connect	votes	for	president	at	the	county	level	to	county-level	conditions	in	the
mortgage	market,	controlling	for	other	economic	and	social	variables,	including	unemployment.	Using	the	Home
Mortgage	Disclosure	Act	(HMDA)	data	on	banks’	provision	of	mortgage	credit,	we	identify	supply	shifts	in	mortgage
credit	at	the	county	level	and	examine	how	these	mortgage	supply	shifts	affected	voting	in	several	Presidential
elections.	We	focus	first	on	mortgage	collapse	from	2004	to	2008,	and	connect	it	to	the	election	results	of	2008.
2004-2008	saw	an	unprecedented	swing	from	the	most	generous	underwriting	standards	for	mortgages	in	U.S.
history	in	2004-2006	to	a	severe	contraction	of	mortgage	credit	supply	during	the	subprime	crisis	of	2007-2009.	It
also	saw	a	dramatic	swing	in	electoral	results,	with	the	Republican	Presidential	candidate	winning	many	key	swing
states	in	2004,	but	losing	those	same	states	in	2008.	Were	the	two	changes	connected?
Figure	1	–		Geographic	representation	of	county-level	growth	in	mortgage	credit	supply,	2004-2008
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Notes:	changes	in	mortgage	credit	supply	at	the	county	level	between	2004-to-2008	are		shown	on	the	map	of	the	US.		Each	county
is	represented	by	a	cell.	The	magnitude	of	the	change	is	colour-coded	from	white	(no	change)	to	dark	red	(large	negative	change).
Because	credit	expansion	occurred	in	only	4%	of	the	US	counties,	it	is	not	observable	on	the	map.
After	controlling	for	other	relevant	factors,	voters	responded	to	the	contraction	in	credit	by	shifting	their	support
away	from	the	Republican	candidate	in	the	2008	presidential	election	(John	McCain).	The	shift	toward	the
Democratic	candidate	(Barack	Obama)	was	particularly	pronounced	in	swing	states	(those	that	have	the	least
predictable	support	for	either	party).	The	magnitude	of	the	voting	impact	of	mortgage	credit	supply	shifts	was	large.
But	for	the	mortgage	credit	supply	contraction,	some	important	swing	states	–	most	obviously,	North	Carolina	–
would	have	cast	their	electoral	votes	for	McCain.	In	other	swing	states,	the	absence	of	mortgage	credit	supply
contraction	by	itself	would	not	have	reversed	the	electoral	result,	but	nevertheless,	would	have	substantially
narrowed	the	gap	between	votes	received	by	McCain	and	Obama	in	2008.	Overall,	if	mortgage	credit	supply	had
not	shifted	adversely	from	2004	to	2008,	McCain	would	have	received	half	the	votes	needed	to	capture	all	nine	of
the	swing	states	that	Bush	had	won	in	2004	but	that	McCain	lost	in	2008,	which	would	have	reversed	the	outcome
of	the	election.	In	that	sense,	the	contraction	in	mortgage	credit	supply	from	2004	to	2008	was	five	times	as
important	as	the	increase	in	the	unemployment	rate;	if	unemployment	had	not	increased	from	2004	to	2008,	that
improvement	in	local	labour	markets	would	only	have	given	McCain	9%	of	the	votes	he	needed	in	those	crucial
swing	states.
Figure	2	–	Swing	states	electoral	counterfactual,	2008
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Notes:	Lost	votes	attributed	to	changes	in	the	supply	of	credit	are	shown	above	for	swing	states.	Swing	states	are	those	where	the
Democrats	won	the	popular	vote	in	2008,	but	not	in	2004.	In	total,	had	the	mortgage	credit	supply	not	changed	between	the	2004	and
2008	elections,	the	Republicans	would	have	received	51%	of	the	votes	needed	to	win	all	swing	states	(82%	if	we	add	a	standard
deviation,).	In	contrast,	had	the	unemployment	rate	not	changed,	they	would	have	received	only	9%	of	the	votes.
Extending	our	analysis	to	other	presidential	elections	from	1996	to	2012,	we	find	that	contractions	in	credit	supply
from	2008	to	2012	penalised	the	incumbent	party	and	benefited	the	candidacy	of	Mitt	Romney.	In	the	mortgage
credit	boom	phase	(in	2000	and	2004),	however,	there	is	no	evidence	that	counties	with	relatively	high	credit
expansion	voted	in	favour	of	either	the	incumbent	party	candidate	for	president.	Voters	punish	incumbent	parties	for
mortgage	credit	crunches	but	do	not	reward	presidential	candidates	of	the	incumbent	party	for	mortgage	credit
booms.	Furthermore,	the	asymmetric	way	voters	react	to	mortgage	credit	changes	does	not	vary	according	to	the
political	party	of	the	incumbent.
Figure	3	–	County-level	growth	in	mortgage	credit	supply	between	presidential	elections,	1996	to	2012
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Notes:	Changes	in	mortgage	credit	supply	by	county	between	two	election	years	are	shown	above.	Four	elections	are	covered.
Our	findings	have	important	implications	for	research	on	the	politics	of	mortgage	credit.	Most	importantly,	our
findings	do	not	lend	support	to	the	view	that	presidential	candidates	gained	direct	votes	from	supporting	the
relaxation	of	underwriting	standards	for	mortgage	lending	from	1996	to	2004.	Whatever	political	rewards	attended
that	support	must	have	come	from	other	sources	(e.g.,	campaign	contributions	from	special	interests).
This	blog	post	is	based	on	the	paper	Mortgage	market	credit	conditions	and	U.S.	Presidential	elections	in	the
European	Journal	of	Political	Economy	and	appeared	originally	at	LSE	Business	Review.
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